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Democracy and Transition in Malaysia:




Late in the afternoon of September 2, 1998, Prime Minister Dr.
Mahathir Mohamad’s office tersely announced, without giving rea-
sons, that Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim had been sacked
from all of his posts in the government. In the early hours of Septem-
ber 4, the Supreme Council of the ruling party, United Malays
National Organization (UMNO), decided to expel Anwar, who was
the party’s deputy president. Anwar’s dismissal occasioned an enor-
mous shock that was aggravated by immediate media revelations of
tawdry allegations against Anwar, his subsequent prosecutions, his
controversial convictions, and the shabby treatment of Anwar’s sup-
porters and opposition groups, whether by police, media, or electoral
methods, which continues to this day.
Much of this, as well as the course of the dissident Reformasi move-
ment, which began with Anwar’s defiant response to his dismissal and
expulsion, is familiar and bears no elaborate repetition here.1 What has
not produced much comment, however, is the quiet, traumatized
shock that UMNO, Malay society, and Malaysian politics in general
felt at losing the third deputy prime minister under Mahathir — the
sudden departure of the man who had been widely hailed as
Mahathir’s “anointed successor” to both UMNO’s presidency and the
premiership.
The sobriquet of anointed successor had not been carelessly employed
by UMNO’s veterans and the media chiefs, all adept at political spin.
Even if Anwar’s “anointment” was most strenuously upheld by his
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supporters, naturally, it had been legitimated by the results of the
UMNO’s triennial party elections of 1993 and 1996. As such, the desig-
nation had helped to assuage the uncertainties caused by years of
UMNO in-fighting that seemed to preclude an assured transfer of
leadership from Mahathir to someone else, if only because that “some-
one else” kept disappearing from view. Mahathir’s first deputy pre-
mier, Musa Hitam, resigned in 1986 over his differences with
Mahathir, but Musa failed afterwards to retain his previously strong
influence over the party. Mahathir’s first minister of finance, Tengku
Razaleigh Hamzah, unsuccessfully fought Mahathir for the party pres-
idency in 1987, and was, after 1998, forced into a marginal opposition.
Ghafar Baba, whom Mahathir appointed as Musa’s replacement, nar-
rowly defeated Musa for UMNO’s deputy presidency in the party elec-
tion of 1987, but Ghafar was, in turn, defeated by Anwar in 1993. In the
mid-1990s, therefore, only Anwar, via two consecutive party elections,2
had secured the depth of party support that signified that a successor
had arrived. Mahathir seemed to have accepted that much himself,
since once, when irked by persistent media speculation over his retire-
ment, he said that Anwar “can step into the job if for some reason I
should drop dead or become disabled.”3
It is useful to recall this neglected dimension of the Anwar affair
because, since Anwar’s fall, there has been no one who can equally
claim to have been popularly accepted as the new successor, despite
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi’s appointment as deputy prime minister in
1999 and election (without contest) as UMNO’s deputy president in
2000.4 Consequently, the post-Anwar situation is regarded either con-
spiratorially, as evidence of Mahathir’s ploy to perpetuate himself in
power, or simply as proof that no one else has been able to command
the support of the UMNO rank and file the way Anwar demonstrated
when he marshaled an unbeatable majority against Ghafar in 1993.
II. Democracy and Transitions
The present uncertainty surrounding a post-Mahathir leadership tran-
sition is somewhat peculiar. On the one hand, Malaysia went through
three transitions in premiership, sometimes under crisis, over a period
of twenty-four years, that is, from 1957, the year of independence, to
1981, when Mahathir became the country’s fourth prime minister.
These transitions were unaccompanied by the kinds of violent seizures
of power seen in some other former colonies, an indication that con-
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tenders for power in Malaysia have abided by institutional provisions
and procedures for resolving issues of leadership succession. On the
other hand, succession itself became more contentious, divisive, and
inconclusive during Mahathir’s (continuing) tenure. This suggests that
established modes of leadership transition now operate under great
strain. Various questions beg themselves at this point. Why has it
become increasingly difficult for the political system to effect a smooth
transition of leadership and power at its highest level? How is the diffi-
culty related to configurations of power involving the state, regimes,
and the ruling party? How can this specific political problem of leader-
ship transition be understood within the broader contexts of social and
political transformation?
Conceptually, one can approach these questions and related issues
by reference to three different kinds of transitions and their connec-
tions to democracy.5 First, one may refer to democratic transition, a sub-
ject of extensive studies of comparative politics that have theoretically
and empirically linked trends of democratization to economic growth,
industrial transformation, and the rise of new middle classes. In the
context of such studies, the Malaysian experience may be seen in prac-
tice to have been a steady movement away from rather than toward
democratization,6 whether that trend is assessed against the end of
authoritarianism in certain Asian and Latin American states, Hunting-
ton’s scenario of a “third wave” of democratization, Fukuyama’s pro-
nouncements on the “end of history,” or some Asian elites’ promotion
of “Asian values.”
Second, one can think of regime transition in the manner of, for exam-
ple, Pempel’s conceptualization of regimes and regime shifts, which
emphasizes the varying political importance of different socioeco-
nomic sectors and the role of state and non-state institutions.7 Some
studies of Malaysian political economy had previously examined simi-
lar issues in relation to the pre-New Economic Policy (NEP), post-NEP,
and the Mahathirist regimes.8 A contrasting perspective, stressing a
lack of regime change as the more suitable subject of inquiry, has been
offered by Crouch’s analysis of the Malaysian model of an ambiguous
“responsive-repressive,” “neither democratic nor authoritarian”
regime, or Case’s characterization of the Malaysian political system as
a semi-democracy notable for its “resistance to regime change.”
Third, one may refer directly to leadership transition and more nar-
rowly examine modes and experiences of transfer of power and politi-
cal succession. This subject has not been explored much in Malaysian
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politics although various writings have commented upon particular
moments of leadership change and the political figures involved.9
Partly for that reason, this essay is largely based on a specific review of
the record of leadership transition from 1957 to 1998. By doing so, it
tracks crucial changes in the modes and experiences of political succes-
sion. The primary concern is to evaluate the implications that those
changes hold for political competition and systemic stability, rather
than policy outcomes.
By virtue of its dominant position in the ruling coalition, UMNO
has always held a monopoly on the highest offices of national leader-
ship, so that the premiership of the country has been coterminous with
the presidency of UMNO. For that reason, UMNO’s internal politics
play a pivotal role in leadership transition: succession at the level of
the party basically decides succession at the national level. Thus, a
large part of this essay seeks to understand how issues of political suc-
cession have been mediated through contests for UMNO’s party presi-
dency and deputy presidency. The essay also seeks to relate problems
of political succession to UMNO’s intensifying factionalism and the
inconstant ability of its top party leaders to limit the scope of the party
at large in determining political succession. Finally, by linking the
issue of leadership transition with both democratic and regime transi-
tions, this essay hopes to cast some light on the political turbulence of
the past few years (beginning with the dismissal of Anwar Ibrahim)
that has raised the issue of Mahathir’s successor with greater urgency
with each passing year of Mahathir’s already long tenure in office.
III. 1957–81: Crises and the Leader’s Prerogative
A. From Tunku Abdul Rahman to Tun Abdul Razak
Leaving aside the entirely different issue of Malaya’s transition from
colonial rule to independent government, Malaysia’s first succession at
the apex of political power took place in September 1970, when Prime
Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman retired, and his deputy, Tun Abdul
Razak, became the nation’s second premier. The political circum-
stances surrounding the transfer of power were critical. Just over a
year before, on May 13, Kuala Lumpur had been engulfed in a spate of
post-election inter-ethnic violence.
Tunku used to regard politics as very much a matter of culture or,
more precisely, an elite subculture of good form and chummy compro-
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mise. Economics rarely caught his attention. But the May 13 violence
was an explosive expression of mass economic expectations, which
were ethnically divisive and politically volatile as they coincided with
real and imagined fissures in the areas of language, culture, and citi-
zenship.10 The violence (and, before that, the May election results,
which were a setback for UMNO and its major coalition partner, MCA)
wrecked the framework of the political economy managed by the rul-
ing coalition, Alliance. This was theorized by some as consociational-
ism, but derided by one of the Alliance’s own critics as a “ridiculous”
laissez-faire formula of “politics for the Malays” and “economics for the
Chinese.”11 The precipitous collapse of the parameters of Alliance rule
provoked a backlash against the political leadership personified by
Tunku. Within UMNO there was an attempted revolt of younger
politicians,12 while on the outside, certain Malay quarters organized
demonstrations demanding Tunku’s resignation.
Tunku’s era was over.13 Tunku nominally remained prime minister
but a bloodless coup, organized by the Malay political elite, transferred
real power to an interim junta, the National Operations Council
(NOC), which ruled the country while Parliament was suspended
under a declaration of emergency. Razak was the Director of the NOC.
Yet in Tunku’s hour of eclipse, Razak, his associate Tun Dr. Ismail
Abdul Rahman, and a select group of the Malay elite were instrumen-
tal in maintaining the formal procedures for an orderly transition of
leadership. While the NOC and the armed forces controlled the coun-
try, this select group of Malay leaders controlled the limits of UMNO’s
internal dissent. They quieted the party revolt, expelled Tunku’s most
prominent detractor, Mahathir, and sent others into temporary exile.
The forms of Tunku’s leadership of party, coalition, and government
were retained until the leadership was officially transferred to Razak.
Tunku was allowed to retire with honor and reward. In short, and in
contrast to the violent coups d’etats in other decolonized states of a
roughly similar “age,” a precedent was set in Malaysia for constitu-
tional and orderly transition having “no immediate break in leader-
ship and no succession crisis.”14
B. From Tun Abdul Razak to Hussein Onn
Razak’s own tenure in the premier’s office was short. Assuming
power, he appointed Dr. Ismail as his deputy but Ismail died in
August 1973. Razak then appointed Hussein Onn, only for Razak him-
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self to die in January 1976. In principle, Hussein’s succession to the
premiership in 1976 was not contested. However, there was a lurking
crisis within UMNO that threatened the acceptability of this succes-
sion. Razak had sought to upgrade the quality of his regime by enlarg-
ing its corps of bureaucrats and technocrats. He insisted that
development required more “administration” than “politics.” Under
the New Economic Policy (NEP), a whole generation of Malay admin-
istrators, technocrats, and professionals were trained at state expense
and equipped with the resources to take charge of economic develop-
ment. But the transition to an NEP-oriented, state interventionist
administration involved a power shift, too, from UMNO’s old guard to
younger politicians who were being groomed by Razak. Just as the
regime’s social engineering project under NEP repudiated the
Alliance’s laissez-faire, so the rise of Razak’s coterie of “young Turks”
marginalized UMNO’s “old style” politicians who supposedly lacked
“the vision and technocratic skills to carry through the restructuring of
society.”15 Not coincidentally Razak’s protégés included Mahathir and
Musa Hitam, who had attacked Tunku Abdul Rahman’s leadership
after May 1969, and their associate Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah.
Following Razak’s death, UMNO was convulsed by a crisis. One
element of the crisis resulted from Hussein’s prosecution on corrup-
tion charges of Harun Idris, a powerful member of the old guard. The
crisis deepened when the old guard struck at Razak’s allies by accus-
ing several of them of being communists. As it turned out, both sides
suffered setbacks. Harun was convicted, expelled from UMNO, and
imprisoned, while several Razak protégés were detained without trial
for being “communist sympathisers,”16 with not even Hussein able to
protect them. However, Hussein’s new administration stabilized, and
the bizarre witch hunt turned out to be just the last gasp of an old
guard being swept aside by the NEP’s technocratic shift. Seen in its
entirety, the transition from Razak to Hussein reaffirms several things.
Hussein’s prior appointment as deputy, bypassing the Malaysian Chi-
nese Association’s Tan Siew Sin, who was Hussein’s senior in the Cab-
inet, made it clear that no non-Malay could be in line for the
premiership.17 It also stressed that the prime minister enjoyed the pre-
rogative of appointing his deputy and, by extension, his successor.
Further, seniority in UMNO counted, and precedent dictated that the
party’s deputy president would become deputy premier and take over
from his predecessor when necessary.
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C. From Hussein Onn to Mahathir Mohamad
But what would happen if there was no deputy, the incumbent deputy
himself having ascended to the party presidency and the premiership?
That was what happened with Hussein upon Razak’s death. In princi-
ple, the new leader’s prerogative to choose a deputy was still
respected, more so, one imagines, in the case of a vacancy created by
death. At any rate, that was what Hussein set out to demonstrate. Yet,
when considering his choice of a deputy premier, he quietly but sur-
prisingly tried to set aside the principle of party seniority. Reportedly,
his preferred candidate was Ghazali Shafie, then the Minister of Home
Affairs. But in UMNO, Ghazali was only a member of the Supreme
Council, having junior rank relative to the party’s three vice-presi-
dents, Ghafar Baba, Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, and Mahathir. For
these three vice-presidents much was at stake because Hussein, who
had suffered a heart attack in 1975, was not expected to choose to
remain long in office. Hence, his deputy could expect to become the
prime minister in relatively short course.
The three competing vice-presidents colluded to entrench the prin-
ciple of seniority by insisting privately to Hussein that his deputy pre-
mier had to be chosen from among them. After fifty-five days of being
without a deputy, Hussein chose Mahathir, which was another sur-
prise. Of the three vice-presidents, the veteran Ghafar had received the
highest number of votes, Razaleigh was a rising emblem of NEP’s
sponsorship of “Malay participation” in a modern restructured econ-
omy, whereas Mahathir (readmitted into UMNO in 1972) had been
elected with the lowest vote. Ghafar resigned from the Cabinet in
protest. Razaleigh bided his time. Once more, the leader’s prerogative
in matters of succession had prevailed, albeit modified by the pre-
tenders’ intervention.
IV. 1981–96: Mandate from the Party
A. Musa Hitam versus Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah
In mid-1981, Hussein announced his intention to retire from active pol-
itics after the June UMNO general assembly, essentially paving the
way for Mahathir to succeed him. There was no doubt that Hussein
endorsed Mahathir as his successor, and there was no one to dispute
Mahathir’s claim to the party presidency. In July, Mahathir became
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Malaysia’s fourth prime minister in what seemed to be the smoothest
succession yet, a transition marked by neither crisis nor contention.
But once more, the vacancy for the deputy presidency (and, it was
understood, deputy premiership, too) led to competition among the
UMNO vice-presidents, now Ghafar, Razaleigh, and Musa Hitam.
Once more, and despite his being a widely popular veteran in his own
right and his experience in government, Ghafar’s claim to either posi-
tion was not strong, especially since Mahathir’s ascendancy marked a
generational hand over of power that essentially precluded older con-
tenders. Superficially, Razaleigh’s claim was stronger than Musa’s, the
former being more senior in the ranks of the vice-presidents. Thus far
in the party’s history, there had only been one obscure and politically
uncontentious contest for UMNO’s deputy presidency. This was way
back in 1956, when Dr. Ismail lost to Tun Razak. However, Razaleigh’s
claim on UMNO’s deputy presidency was challenged by Musa. There
were murmurings among the Razaleigh supporters that Mahathir and
Razaleigh had privately agreed upon a pact five years before in which
Razaleigh accepted Hussein’s selection of Mahathir, but in return
Mahathir would appoint Razaleigh in due course. Technically, though,
Mahathir was arguably unable to exercise the leader’s prerogative to
appoint a deputy immediately since the formal transition from Hus-
sein to Mahathir would take place only after the June 1981 general
assembly that ratified Mahathir’s presidency. Ideologically, therefore,
the circumstances supported a current of argument that fastened upon
the party, via the balloting of the delegates to the general assembly, as
the mechanism for deciding who should become Mahathir’s deputy in
the party and the government.
Apropos the 1981 Razaleigh-Musa contest for UMNO’s deputy
presidency, the party folklore from the period may be roughly divided
between two views. One view held that Mahathir, as president-to-be,
stayed neutral and remained above the fray. Those who inclined to this
view argued that by not becoming president until after UMNO’s gen-
eral assembly, “Mahathir had no choice but to concede to the party
delegates to decide their choice for Deputy President.”18 But they
might concede that Mahathir, on the quiet, set his “gurkhas” (followers
or loyalists in UMNO parlance) to campaign for Musa.19 An opposing
view regarded the whole affair as an elaborate ploy to deny Razaleigh
what was rightfully his. Those who took this second view maintained
that Mahathir’s reluctance or refusal to appoint or support Razaleigh
was a self-interested maneuver because Mahathir considered him to be
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a more dangerous rival than Musa.20 There is also an intriguing out-
sider’s view that it was Hussein himself who threw open the deputy
president’s contest by resigning as party president just before the gen-
eral assembly.21
Whatever the correct interpretation, the fact that UMNO’s 1981 elec-
tion delegates were at liberty to select Mahathir’s deputy effectively
opened the way for the party at large to become directly involved in
the process of determining leadership succession. In UMNO’s and
Malaysian political history, therefore, the 1981 Razaleigh-Musa battle
set a momentous precedent, following which political succession could
scarcely remain the bailiwick of a small elitist cabal within the ruling
party, or the party’s mere endorsement of the president’s preference.
No one anticipated it then, but a novel development in UMNO’s poli-
tics and a new twist to political succession had emerged. Henceforth,
political succession would be mediated through the party’s triennial
election but could no longer be separated from a spreading party fac-
tionalism. This was reflected in the intensity of the Musa-Razaleigh
contest in 1981, which Musa won, and confirmed by the bitterness of a
second Musa-Razaleigh fight in 1984, which was again won by Musa.
Both contests took a heavy toll on the integrity and stability of the
party.
B. Team A versus Team B
In February 1986, Musa suddenly resigned as deputy prime minister
and UMNO deputy president. His reason was that certain policy differ-
ences with Mahathir had led the prime minister to suspect his deputy
of discrediting him and working to “bring him down.”22 Some quarters
in UMNO urged Musa to reconsider. Musa partially relented. He with-
drew his resignation as UMNO’s deputy president, saying that while
he was appointed deputy premier by Mahathir, he had been twice
elected deputy president by the party. Faced with this party crisis and
his own declining popularity, and perhaps looking ahead to the party
election scheduled for April 1987, Mahathir picked the veteran Ghafar
Baba to replace Musa, incidentally making it four times Razaleigh had
been bypassed for deputy premier!23 That, and Musa’s parting of the
ways with Mahathir, set the stage for an all-out struggle for UMNO’s
highest posts.24 A contemporary journalistic account mused:
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Will Musa run against Mahathir or settle for a defence of the No. 2 post?
Will Razaleigh run against Mahathir or against Ghafar Baba, an old
friend and ally who supported him in two contests against Musa? Will
there be a three-cornered fight between Mahathir, Musa and Razaleigh
for the top post or a Ghafar-Musa-Razaleigh struggle for deputy? Might
not old foes Razaleigh and Musa team up to take on Mahathir and Gha-
far? Or perhaps Razaleigh, not fancying his chances against Ghafar or
Mahathir, might team up with them to take on the common enemy:
Musa. When it comes to the crunch, will Mahathir and Ghafar stick
together?25
It transpired that Mahathir and Ghafar stuck together while Raza-
leigh and Musa became allies. Razaleigh challenged Mahathir for the
presidency, and Ghafar took on Musa. Further down the party hierar-
chy, UMNO’s elite — cabinet ministers, deputy ministers and chief
ministers — divided into being members of “Team A,” the Mahathir-
Ghafar faction, or “Team B,” the Razaleigh-Musa faction. All of
UMNO was split as the novel development in the party’s politics and
the new twist in political succession reached their zenith. The leaders
could only fight for survival. The party would decide the succession.26
Not for nothing, then, did Team A and Team B’s doctrinal differentia-
tions come to settle on such matters as the party president’s mandate,
continuity of leadership, legitimacy of challenge, and the need for “the
party to control the government.”27 Team B’s quest for a change in
leadership failed marginally. Mahathir defeated Razaleigh by 761
votes to 718, while Musa lost to Ghafar by 699 to 739 (in a contest that
included 41 spoiled votes). In defeat, Razaleigh and one of his Team B
allies, Rais Yatim, resigned their cabinet positions. In victory, Mahathir
purged all the remaining Team B ministers and deputy ministers from
his cabinet, not caring that one minister, Abdullah Badawi, came in
second among the three vice-presidents, while the others were elected
to the party’s Supreme Council.
From then on, Mahathir and his allies would not permit any further
challenges to his leadership. Razaleigh’s camp28 tried to contest the
validity of the election in court. The outcomes of that continuation of
the leadership war by other means were, first, the de-registration of
UMNO as a party;29 second, a wave of mass arrests of dissidents and
opposition politicians as UMNO’s split coincided with a general
heightening of inter-ethnic tensions;30 and, finally, the emasculation of
the judiciary.31 Further, a new party, UMNO Baru (New UMNO), was
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registered that entirely excluded Razaleigh and his staunchest allies.
These outcomes of the turmoil of April 1987 were spectacular and
tragic but did not affect the configuration of the UMNO leadership. In
short, after the party had decided the core issue of succession, the
leader went back to exercising his prerogative in determining who was
to survive in government.
C. Anwar Ibrahim versus Ghafar Baba
Learning from April 1987, UMNO’s leadership sought to strengthen
the position of incumbents by amending the party’s constitutional pro-
visions governing its triennial elections. In particular, it stipulated that
one would only be eligible to contest a top position (from Supreme
Council membership to the presidency) if he or she received a mini-
mum number of nominations by UMNO divisions. Additionally, each
nomination for the post of president or deputy president automatically
earned the candidate ten “bonus” votes (in addition to actual ballots
cast on the day of the election by individual delegates to the annual
general assembly). Viewed strategically, these changes were instituted
to forestall a repetition of Razaleigh’s 1987 maneuver, which had been
effective in masking the extent of his support by having his supporters
“under-nominate” him. In power terms, these were conservative
moves to centralize authority, disempower any disruptive challenge,
consolidate incumbency, and protect the continuity of leadership.
They were also ideologically consonant with the communitarian-
authoritarian “Asian values” promoted by Mahathir in the early
1990s.32 With Razaleigh and his supporters forced to reorganize them-
selves into a new party (Parti Semangat 46, or Spirit of 46 Party),33 and
Musa having faded from the political scene, Mahathir appeared to
have retrieved the leader’s prerogative to determine questions of suc-
cession from the party at large, leaving the latter with the dubious
privilege of “mandating” what the leader(s) had decided . . . provided
that the leaders always remained united. But UMNO’s factionalism
did not end with the exclusion of former dissidents; that merely
allowed new figures to flourish. For all that Mahathir’s own position
was unassailable, there were centers of power where his writ was not
supreme. And since Mahathir had had quintuple coronary bypass
operations in 1990, the surest transit to UMNO’s summit was seem-
ingly offered by the deputy’s post — again. There, Ghafar’s incum-
bency did not inspire awe among the ambitious.
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Anwar Ibrahim, then one of the vice-presidents and a key figure in
Team A’s 1987 campaign and Minister of Finance, moved to challenge
Ghafar in 1993.34 Anwar did it with such masterly exploitation of
UMNO’s new rules for elections that no Anwar-Ghafar fight actually
took place! The cornerstone of his strategy was an alliance of a new
generation of leaders, presented to the party as the Wawasan Team (or
Vision Team): Anwar for deputy president, and Muhyiddin Yasin,
Najib Tun Razak, and Muhammad Muhammad Taib for vice-presi-
dents.35 Then, as division after division in UMNO nominated Anwar
for deputy president, his total number of “automatic votes” became
mathematically unbeatable even before the general assembly began.36
With impotent protest, Ghafar resigned from the government and did
not defend his deputy president’s post. At UMNO’s election, the
Wawasan Team swept the three vice-president’s posts.37 From another
perspective, the Anwar-led team approach also brought to the contest
a catchy representation of the issue of succession. The truth was that
only one side acted as a team. Ghafar and the vice-presidents, Abdul-
lah Badawi and Sanusi Junid, did not band together as a cohesive unit.
In a broader sociopolitical milieu resonant with a Mahathir-inspired
chorus of ideologically upbeat refrains about how the Malays had
modernized themselves into Melayu Baru (New Malays), Ghafar,
Abdullah, and Sanusi suffered the image deficit of being lumped
together as an aging trio, exactly ripe to be succeeded!
In hindsight, the Wawasan Team’s campaign in 1993 almost uncan-
nily duplicated Team B’s 1987 initiative, except that the president was
unopposed and the upstarts were successful.38 Mahathir’s own attitude
toward the Anwar-led campaign was perhaps ambivalent. Mahathir
seemed to be divided between expressing empathy for an old loyalist
(Ghafar) and appreciating the ambition of a protégé (Anwar). He ini-
tially appeared to disapprove of a contest against Ghafar, but once
Anwar’s campaign quickened, Mahathir acceded to the inevitable.
Another way of looking upon 1993, then, is to regard the outcome as
evidence of the resilience of the party at large to impose its succession
preference upon the incumbent leadership.
V. 1998: The Power of the State
Shortly after Anwar’s 1993 victory, he was promoted to Deputy Prime
Minister. It seemed then that Mahathir’s heir apparent had been
found, and that Mahathir, having been in power since 1981, would
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step down before too long. Anwar, for all his ambition, would remain
loyal to Mahathir until then. But whether Mahathir would soon depart
office and whether Anwar would patiently wait his turn became huge
questions that hung over practically all developments concerning
UMNO between 1994 and 1995.39 Rumors became rife about a rift
between Anwar and Mahathir, which could lead Anwar to challenge
Mahathir in 1996, whether from voluntary decision or because of com-
pulsion from his supporters.40 Mahathir and Anwar protested this line
of thinking. Anwar proclaimed his loyalty to Mahathir, while
Mahathir expressed his confidence in Anwar, evidently to no avail.
Maybe too many quarters preferred to believe that both men protested
too much. Then the rumors began to take on a new twist. Mahathir
would undermine Anwar’s influence in UMNO by backing a new con-
testant for the party deputy presidency. Sometimes the would-be chal-
lenger was said to be Anwar’s ally of 1993, Najib Tun Razak, the
Minister of Education. At other times, so improbable a candidate as
Mahathir’s old foe and Spirit of 46 returnee, Razaleigh Hamzah, was
mentioned.41
Whatever the truth, the underlying riddle of the 1996 UMNO elec-
tion was whether Anwar could extend his influence over the party.
Mahathir tackled the riddle by having the Supreme Council pass three
new rulings regarding the impending election.42 The first ruling took
its cue from the 1995 UMNO General Assembly, which had resolved
that the two top party posts should not be contested. Now the party’s
divisions could only nominate Mahathir for president and Anwar for
deputy president. Any other nomination or configuration of nomina-
tion for the party’s two top posts would be rejected. The second ruling
stipulated that candidates for the three vice-president’s posts and the
twenty-five Supreme Council seats (as well as for all posts in Pemuda
UMNO, the youth wing, and Wanita UMNO, the women’s wing) were
required to register their candidacy five months before the general
assembly. This stipulation significantly departed from UMNO’s tradi-
tion of allowing contenders to engage in diverse forms of campaigning
long before they declared their candidacy. Most contenders resorted to
this form of concealment in the past partly for the tactical advantage of
throwing off their opponents, and partly in deference to a supposedly
Malay cultural distaste for a premature display of personal ambition.
Razaleigh had used a late declaration to great effect in 1987, but, more
pertinently, so had Anwar against Ghafar in 1993. And then, just five
days after the permissible starting date for campaigning, the UMNO
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Supreme Council banned any further campaigning ahead of the Octo-
ber general assembly. In Mahathir’s words, the Supreme Council’s ban
on campaigning was:
the party’s way of ensuring fairness to all because there are some candi-
dates who can afford to campaign while others cannot. Members have
come up to some candidates who are clean and said we will not support
you if you don’t give us money. Banning campaigning is one way to
level out the opportunity for all.43
As it turned out, the Anwar camp swept the Pemuda UMNO and
Wanita UMNO elections. Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, an Anwar ally,
emerged as president of Pemuda UMNO, while critical support from
the Anwar camp enabled Siti Zaharah to win the Wanita UMNO presi-
dency against the incumbent Rafidah Aziz. Yet there was to be no
sweep by the Anwar camp at the parent body’s election. For the vice-
presidential contests, no key Anwar ally was returned. Najib Tun
Razak and Muhammad Muhammad Taib were re-elected, while
Abdullah Badawi regained the seat he had lost in 1993. Najib and
Muhammad were members of the 1993 Wawasan Team but had since
distanced themselves from Anwar, while Abdullah Badawi, a former
Musa associate, was a popular figure in his own right. Significantly,
Muhyiddin Yasin, still identified as an Anwar man, was not re-elected
despite receiving the highest vote for vice-president in 1993. In addi-
tion, Mahathir loyalists dominated the new Supreme Council.
The crowning glory of Mahathir’s performance in 1996 was not just
his control over the party. It was that he shifted the burden of the suc-
cession question away from himself—to Anwar! Mahathir made clear
that he would continue as UMNO’s president and Malaysia’s prime
minister, and refused to set a succession timetable:
Why should I give a clear timetable? The moment you give a timetable,
you are a lame duck. That’s what happens to Western leaders. . . .  No, I
have given nothing. I have said nothing. I can go any time now or 10
years later or whatever. Depends on what the situation is like. I told you
whoever is in place as my deputy will succeed me.44
Following the 1996 election, Anwar’s chief concern was, in fact, to
secure his “Number 2” spot and outlive Mahathir, so that “he [Anwar]
can step into the job if for some reason [Mahathir] should drop dead or
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become disabled.”45 Rumors persisted of differences in style, policy,
and interests between Mahathir and Anwar,46 but the former remained
in power and the latter continued to be the “anointed successor.” The
1996 election had proven that Anwar’s control of the party was less
powerful than speculated. Time seemed to be on his side, however, as
he set out to spread his influence over UMNO. By 1998, indeed, as the
UMNO divisions completed their elections (both of office-bearers and
delegates to the 1999 general assembly), it was widely assumed that
the Anwar camp commanded the loyalty of a plurality of the dele-
gates. Such strong support, supplemented by support from other fac-
tions in UMNO, might be sufficient for Anwar to mount a successful
campaign against Mahathir in 1999, should a contest for the presi-
dency take place.
Up until mid-1997, a smooth transition from Mahathir to Anwar
was not an implausible scenario.47 However, July 1997 ruined that sce-
nario, as the subsequent development of the East Asian financial crisis
made it highly unlikely that Mahathir would leave office under a
cloud, and the domestic management of the economic crisis in
Malaysia ruptured relations between “No. 1” and “No. 2.”48 An ade-
quate treatment of the politics of the July 1997 crisis, including differ-
ences between Mahathir and Anwar, is beyond the scope of this
essay.49 Suffice it to note that the flashpoint came in June 1998. On the
eve of the UMNO general assembly, Zahid, Pemuda UMNO president,
openly questioned practices of “cronyism” and “nepotism” in
Malaysian economic management in ways reminiscent of the Indone-
sian Reformasi’s attack on kolusi, korupsi and nepotisme (collusion, cor-
ruption and nepotism) that had toppled Suharto in May. It is not
completely clear whether Anwar personally directed his supporters to
launch that criticism of Mahathir or whether he mistakenly went along
with it.50 Zahid’s criticism quickly fizzled out under Mahathir’s pecu-
liar counterattack that unabashedly claimed that his policies of “crony-
ism” had assisted “six million cronies,” meaning Malay beneficiaries of
NEP and other state programs.51 The truth was that Zahid’s criticism
was widely construed to be an organized, Anwar-led attempt to
embarrass and discredit Mahathir, maybe to the extent of pressuring
him to resign.52 At any rate, Anwar realized too late that Mahathir now
considered him an imminent threat. Anwar afterwards protested his
loyalty to Mahathir to no avail. Between the June UMNO general
assembly and Malaysia’s national day (August 31), rumors abounded
that Anwar would be forced to resign as deputy prime minister. The
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rumors were proven wrong, and crucially so. Evidently, behind the
scenes, Mahathir’s intermediaries asked Anwar to resign but he
refused. On the afternoon of September 2, the Prime Minister fired his
deputy. UMNO’s Supreme Council met, and, in the early hours of Sep-
tember 4, decided to expel its deputy president on the grounds of his
allegedly immoral conduct. Each of these two decisions had a special
significance. The Prime Minister’s decision relied on his control of the
state to crush a deputy feared to have garnered popular control of the
party at large.53 The Mahathir-dominated Supreme Council’s decision
preempted any Anwar comeback in UMNO via a Musa-style separa-
tion between being deputy prime minister and being UMNO deputy
president. Confirmation of Mahathir’s two-pronged suppression of
any Anwar-inspired party-based dissidence came in early 1999 when
the Supreme Council indefinitely postponed the 1999 party election.
His assumed plurality of delegates having come to naught, Anwar
unwittingly and ironically vindicated the shrewdness of Mahathir’s
maneuvers when the former subsequently revealed that he would
have challenged Mahathir in 1999.
VI. Conclusion
A short essay cannot comprehensively cover a forty-one-year history
of leadership transition. The preceding discussion only offers a guide
to the modes of transition that generally defined three periods in
which leadership transition raised issues of democracy and political
competition, albeit within the narrow ambit of party politics. To sum-
marize, the prerogative of the UMNO president-cum-premier was
generally heeded in the first period. It is a moot question whether this
tacit acceptance of the leader’s prerogative represented a vindication
of a democratic observance of established procedures, or a confirma-
tion of UMNO’s and Malaysia’s “semi,” “quasi,” or “modified”
democracy. In any case, a basically uncontested exercise of the leader’s
prerogative facilitated a controlled and relatively smooth transition
under diverse circumstances, namely, a bloodless coup, an unexpected
death, and a voluntary retirement. During the second period, the prob-
lem of succession was sharply contentious as unrestrained competition
among UMNO’s rival centers of power coincided with the ability of
the party to participate directly in the process of determining
Mahathir’s successor. It is likewise moot whether the party’s “man-
date,” arguably a democratic improvement over the “leader’s preroga-
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tive,” was to be preferred, since its price was the party’s institutional
instability. In the third period, the shifting balance of power between
the leader and the party at large appeared to reach a stalemate. The
leader no longer trusted the party on the matter of his succession. In a
time of severe economic crisis, this was synonymous with his own sur-
vival. At that juncture, Mahathir’s actual control of the state rendered
Anwar’s reputed control of the party a dispensable formality.
Thus, a forty-one-year record of leadership transition ended in the
sordid Anwar affair. Even if a balanced evaluation of its record allows
for swings toward and not just away from democratic leanings, clearly it
is not accurate to regard UMNO as an oasis of democracy in a bleak
milieu of increasingly authoritarian rule. UMNO’s record paralleled
the political system’s basic transition away from democracy as incum-
bent regimes refined their techniques of resisting meaningful change.
Hence, reforms of UMNO alone will not result in future forms of lead-
ership transition that permit competitive and democratic political suc-
cession, in the pluralist sense of both words. To the extent that the
political leadership is intolerant of regime change at the level of the
nation, it will be intolerant of regime change within the party. It is
instructive that there is now a popular understanding that issues of
leadership transition cannot be allowed to be determined by the inter-
nal politics of the dominant party alone. In the remarkably heightened
political consciousness of the Reformasi period, before the November
1999 general election, various popular sectors were beginning to sug-
gest an institutionalized limit to the tenure of any prime minister. It
was not a suggestion that quickly made the electoral or political
agenda. Although it must be the subject of another study, the possibil-
ity should not be ruled out altogether, especially if the uncertainties of
succession catalyze another round of factional fighting that brings
UMNO to implosion. 
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seen Malaysia transformed from a largely agrarian economy at independence in 1957 to
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ity-producing and net oil-exporting country. But a state-supported program of industri-
alization, largely based on foreign direct investment in the labor-intensive and
export-oriented manufacture of textiles, garments, and electronic products had com-
menced in the 1970s. This program was followed in the 1980s by a state-sponsored drive
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21. Kershaw 1989, p. 129. In this case, regionalist sentiments may also have played a part.
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following his defeats by Musa, and the fourth arising from not being picked to replace
Musa.
24. Khoo 1995, pp. 261–271.
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26. Without, of course, reifying the party here.
27. Kershaw 1989.
28. The reference to Razaleigh’s camp is intentional. Team B’s cohesion ended after the
party election. Musa’s camp believed that the 41 spoilt votes that led to Musa’s defeat
were cast by Razaleigh loyalists.
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34. For a summary account of the 1993 UMNO party election, see Case 1996, pp. 234 –
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35. Or “Vision Team,” with its sly reference to Mahathir’s widely popular Wawasan 2020
(Vision 2020).
36. The details of Anwar’s strategy are beyond the scope of this essay. However, there
were undocumented charges of money politics, that is, vote buying, being practiced by
managers of the Wawasan Team. Other than that, Rahim Tamby Chik, then Chief Minis-
ter of Melaka, Ghafar’s home state, arranged for UMNO Melaka divisions to be among
the first to nominate Anwar, an ominous portent for Ghafar.
37. Rahim Tamby Chik, the other Wawasan Team member, handily won the presidency
of UMNO Youth.
38. This point should not be overly stretched. In 1987, Ghafar was the upstart who chal-
lenged Musa.
39. For example, when the then 70-year-old Mahathir declared, after his 1995 electoral
triumph, that he was young “compared to Deng Xiaoping,” his statement was taken to
mean that Mahathir would not voluntarily relinquish his position. But when key
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42. Khoo 1997a.
43. Far Eastern Economic Review (25 July 1996): 16. Not coincidentally, perhaps, Anwar’s
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44. Citations from this interview were taken from its full text, “Prime Minister thrives on
no-nonsense policies,” then available at the Far Eastern Economic Review’s website,
http://www.feer.com. For an abridged version of the interview, see V. G. Kulkarni,
Murray Hiebert, and S. Jayasankaran, “Tough Talk,” Far Eastern Economic Review (24
October 1996): 23, 26–27.
45. Time (9 December 1996): 28
46. Consider, for instance, that each time a Malay-controlled (and occasionally a non-
Malay-controlled) corporation landed a major commercial deal or government project,
there would be an attempt to identify its corporate head as either a Mahathir or an
Anwar man. Soon business and press circles were suggesting that “Anwar’s boys” were
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increasingly anxious that they were being edged out by “Mahathir’s cronies” in the com-
petition for plum contracts and projects.
47. Despite Mahathir’s refusal to set a timetable for his retirement, I had speculated that
Mahathir, in the style of Malay politics, did float a succession balloon in 1994–95 (Khoo
1997a, 175–76).
48. It is instructive to recall that Musa’s differences with Mahathir, which led to their
falling out in 1986, became irreconcilable as the Malaysian economy slipped into reces-
sion in 1985 so that the Mahathir-Musa rift reflected a wider dissatisfaction with
Mahathir’s leadership and policies.
49. Funston 1999; Khoo 2000a.
50. Jomo 2001, pp. xx, 44.
51. Khoo 1998.
52. Ibid.
53. I wish to thank Francis Loh for pointing out to me that September 2 was not the first
time when control of the state prevailed over control of a party. See Loh (1982) for a dis-
cussion of the way in which the Perak Task Force “reformers” of the Malaysian Chinese
Association were defeated by their party elite with state intervention. Back in 1959, too,
Lim Chong Eu, then MCA president, was practically ousted from the party’s leadership
by Tunku Abdul Rahman, then UMNO president and prime minister (von Vorys 1975:
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